Coroner Graeme Johnstone's findings pretty much confirm what was already known through the media about the circumstances of James Gould's death:

  • there were about 100 cyclists on the Hell Ride on 26 August 2006
  • the speed of the group was between 40 and 50 km/h (that is, they were not exceeding the speed limit)
  • Mr Gould had waited for the pedestrian lights to change and display the green walk signal
  • about 20 riders proceeded through the red traffic light
  • the following riders slowed and were stopping
  • some cyclists continued through the red light and one of them struck Mr Gould
  • Mr Gould died later in hospital from head injuries

Careless culture

A couple of things point to a careless culture in the Hell Ride. Firstly, that some riders who were clearly not at the front of the pack and therefore could not have had a clear view ahead were pressuring to keep going through the red.

Secondly, the argument from William Raisin-Shaw's lawyer that the cyclist

was faced with the "choice between the inevitable accident or possible accident" as Mr. Raisin-Shaw was worried about being hit from behind. The "inevitable accident" presumably relates to Mr. Raisin-Shaw being faced with the certainty of a bunch of cyclists coming from behind at speed who could not stop
[emphasis added]

This would seem to suggest that there are real questions about the internal safety of the Hell Ride—that it is inherently risky to its participants. I think this is self-evident: travelling in a tight pack brings a certain level of risk and increasing numbers multiplies that risk. But if this risk were not manageable, thousands of sane people would not participate—quite safely—in pack training rides every day. What seems to make it tricky in packs like the Hell Ride is when some people put their own pace and keeping the pack together above road rules and safety concerns.

Adequate stopping distance

VicRoads provided some good evidence to indicate that sight lines to the pedestrian operated signals are unobstructed and that the stopping sight distance was more than ample.

I note that the VicRoads evidence takes into account the stopping distance for a single bicycle travelling at 40 kmph, calculated under the circumstances as approximately 55 metres assuming a reaction time of 2.5 secs. I suggest that both reaction time and stopping distance for a group of bicycles travelling at 40 km/h might be a bit longer, although it probably doesn't make a practical difference to this conclusion:

The adequacy of the sight distances at this location is further evidenced by the fact that, in the case involving Mr. Gould, 30 cyclists at the front of the bunch were able to see the red light and stop before entering the crossing. It is suggested that the small group of cyclists that failed to stop at the red light chose not to comply with the traffic lights.

That seems to be consistent with testimony about calls of "Rolling", "Rolling." from behind.

Police action

The Coroner summarised action, both proactive and punitive, that Police have taken over the past few years aimed at modifying the behaviour of the Hell Ride. I have no first-hand knowledge of these activities, but it's pretty clear that for whatever reason they were not effective.

Coroner Johnstone quoted from the Police submission, which described the Hell Ride as a disorganised race in which riders set out to achieve personal best times.

"This resulted in some riders disobeying traffic control signals and signs, using the incorrect side of the roadway, travelling in excess of three abreast and sometimes using aggressive, intimidating tactics to other road users, principally motorists."

I have absolutely no doubt that this sort of misbehaviour occurs and it's deplorable.

However I would mention in passing that the only reason cyclists using aggressive, intimidating tactics against motorists is noteworthy is because it's so unusual; the normal state of affairs is exactly the reverse (and it therefore not noteworthy).

Conclusions and recommendations

In Coroner Johnstone's conclusion he emphasised that:

there has been virtually no effective leadership from the group to drive a responsible safety message.

While not ignoring the behaviour of one individual from the group, the Coroner clearly sees the problem as residing primarily with the group as a whole. It's true that to a certain extent Raisin-Shaw was 'unlucky' in that it could have been a number of other riders who collided with Mr Gould but I don't think the Coroner is trying to devalue that cyclist's personal responsibility for what happened (and I know I'm not).

The Coroner goes on to say that

The behaviour of this large group as was evidenced by the incident where Mr. Gould died is indicative of a high risk event or activity that is not suitable for either suburban streets or on main roads where the public frequent.

Mr Gould's death notwithstanding, I'm not convinced that the statistics would back up the evaluation of the Hell Ride as high risk or unsuitable for suburban streets. That said, I think this suggestion is well worth considering:

With large numbers who are 'training' at speed, it is the type of event that needs to be planned by responsible cycling organisations and/or authorised by the authorities and provided with various risk management countermeasures. If it is to be regarded as a group training activity then speed and bunching needs to be managed by those in the group so as to be able to stop when required at lights.

I mentioned yesterday that the Hell Ride needs to be managed not banished, and a first step towards effective management might be bringing it under the auspices of a suitable organisation. I'm not suggesting that it would be easy to do and there would be practical problems to solve, but it's well worth discussing. It might have been helpful if the Coroner had named a suitable organisation or authority and suggested some risk management measures, but that would probably be over-reaching the scope of his role and expertise.

Although the media said so (see The Age and ABC News) something the Coroner did not say is that the Hell Ride is a recipe for disaster. His exact words were:

There is little doubt that large groups or bunches of cyclists running pedestrian lights or red lights is a recipe for disaster.

It's an important distinction: people ignoring red lights is the problem. And that problem is not restricted to the Hell Ride or even cyclists for that matter. It need not be a group of cyclists for the Coroner's following statement to be true:

With the running of red lights it is only a matter of time before we see a catastrophe when a car proceeding through an intersection with a green light strikes a group of cyclists.

If the Hell Ride can control itself at red lights, this recipe for disaster no longer applies.

Earlier in the report, the Coroner noted

A number of the submissions to the Coroner focussed on the social and safety aspects of traveling in groups or bunches. The submissions also focussed on the need to improve the safety of the road infrastructure, improve the delivery of educational material developed by the sport's own bodies, improve ethics and the understanding of the safety issues from the perspective of the motorist.

But his conclusion makes no recommendations in respect of these submissions, which represents an opportunity missed.

Comments

Rob

Personal responsibility cannot be abrogated by group dynamics. Saul Raisin Shaw knows this but is claiming otherwise in his defense. It is an old and invalid assertion that a moving group of bicycles, motor cycles or motor vehicles is akin to an articulated vehicle. The front may enter a green light and the rear may leave a red light. However whereas the articulated vehicle is a single entity, physically and legally, the group of moving vehicles no matter what they are is comprised of separate legal persons in control, each able to make rational and responsible decisions to direct actions and reactions and to observe the laws of the road. Personal rsponsiblity is the essential failing in the matter of the death of James Gould, the sooner that is accepted the sooner all road users will move forward and act to acquire and apply the necessary skill set and attitude to road use and discharge their responsiblility of keeping a proper look out and maintaining a duty of care towards all other road users. Nothing less is acceptable.

Treadly and Me

I hadn't heard about this "articulated vehicle" argument but I don't think it takes much to break it down—it doesn't hold together logically or intuitively. You only need to ask something like: as a rider toward the rear of a pack, would you swerve to avoid a pothole? Answer "no" and you're clearly lying, answer "yes" and you're clearly an autonomous discrete individual not part of an articulated vehicle.

Rob

The "articulated vehicle" claim comes up often amongst a those who have a bit of gravel under their skin. I was waiting for the start at the Southern Vets Road Champs last year at Cora Lynn, it was just after James Gould's sad death and the guys in the " more mature" age group seemed divided on whether a bunch should keep "rolling" ...one very vocal past pro and current big head said..." well you know a bunch is the same as a big truck, its a semi, if the front is through the green and the lights change keep rolling... let eveyrone keep rolling, the traffic can wait..."

I gave himn an ear full and he knew he wouldnt get a drag off me that day...(not that it mattered, I blew up on the first climb...)

I've heard this often, and from people who should know better...that is why some attitudes will be hard to change by education alone, it will take a rude a wakening for some...Like the anti-hoon laws on road dragging in supped up cars , maybe some serious enforcment might shake a few of these thoughts and behaviours out of the old wood.

jimmay

While I would not condone the running of red lights, there has been little discussion regarding the role of traffic signals and speed limit signs in affecting traffic behaviour. James Gould, in a decision that ultimately led to his tragic death, trusted a green man indicating that it was safe to proceed over the evidence of his eyes and ears telling him that there was imminent danger.

To what extent have so-called safety measures encouraged individuals to trust signals and signage over judgement?

Treadly and Me

At this point, I've said just about all I want to say about the Hell Ride and the death of James Gould. However, in response to jimmay's comment, I'd repeat what I said in August last year:

This isn't about blaming the victim but Mr Gould was a local who regularly walked in the area, so he must have been familiar with how pack riders travel on Beach Rd. So what was peculiar about the conditions when he stepped out onto the road on Saturday?

Then, as now, we are no closer to having an answer.

But I doubt that he stepped into the middle of a moving peloton. The overwhelming evidence, both presented to the Coroner and heard anecdotally, is that the bulk of the pack had stopped at the lights. Presumably, it was this not the green light that indicated to Mr Gould that it was safe to cross. Sadly, the stationary pack would also have impaired his view of cyclists approaching unexpectedly on the outside.

Idle speculation, for what it's worth.